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IN THE ~UPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION, 
a corporation, and CITY 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
v. 
ENSIGN COMPANY, a limited 
partnership, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Civil No. 15410 
INTRODUCTION 
Initially it should be noted that respondents have 
made no attempt to meet most of appellant's arguments. Thus 
appellant argued in its Main Brief at 12-15 that it cannot be 
bound by an order of which it had no notice. Respondents' only 
response was to assert (erroneously) that appellant failed to 
raise the issue below (Resp. Br. 24). Appellant argued the rn9~ 
ing of the Judgment on Stipulation of July 23, 1971, on which all 
subsequent proceedings were based, in its Main Brief at length 
because of its importance. (App. Main Br. at 18-30). Respondent: 
never mention the meaning of that crucial document. Appellant 
argued that the April 8, 1975 "order" is without factual sup~rt 
in the Record. (App. Main Br. at 31-35) . Respondents failed to 
point to any specific portions of the Record which support the 
"order." Appellant argued that the April 8, 1975 "order•· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
violated its due process rights by failing to afford appellant 
notice and hearing. (App. Main Br. at 35-37) Respondents 
ignored this entirely. 
Despite respondents' failure to join argument on the 
merits appellant believes a Reply Brief is necessary to (a) 
refute respondents' main contention that the April 8, 1975 "order" 
was a final order from which appellant did not timely appeal, (b) 
refute certain factual assertions made by respondents that are 
without specific Record support, and (c) briefly respond to 
respondents' arguments on the merits of the judgment from which 
appellant appeals. 
I. THE APRIL 8, 1975 "ORDER" WAS NOT FINAL AND HENCE 
WAS NOT APPEALABLE. 
The bulk of respondents' argument (Resp. Br. 9-17) is 
devoted to the proposition that the April 8, 1975, ''order" should 
have been appealed or preserved for appeal (by filing a notice of 
intention to appeal) within 30 days of its entry. While respond-
ents sometimes misconceive this argument as involving the 
principle of res judicata~(Resp. Br. 10) the basic issue in-
volved is whether the April 8, 1975 "order" was final within the 
meaning of Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The issue of finality revolves around two Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 72(a) and 54(b). The two rules are but 
opposite sides of the same coin, implementing this Court's long-
standing policy against hearing appeals piecemeal. Rule 72(a), 
~/Res judicata is aptly illustrated by Krofcheck v. 
Downey State~nk, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978) • 
-2-
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governing appeals as of right (as opposed to discretionary appea] 
from interlocutory orders), provides that appeals lie "from all 
final orders and judgments . 
" Rule 72(a) recognizes two 
types of final orders and judgments. The first and most obvious 
is the judgment or order that wholly terminates the proceedings i: 
the lower court. Such an order or judgment is final because 
nothing remains to be done in the lower court. If he desires 
review, an appellant must timely file a notice of appeal. 
The second type of final judgment Rule 72 (a) recognizes 
is one that wholly terminates certain claims in an action even 
though other claims remain to be determined. In that case, the 
judgment is nevertheless final with regard to the claims wholly 
determined, and an appellant, to preserve his right of appeal, 
must timely file a notice of intent to appeal after determination 
of the remaining claims. A judgment or order disposing of w~ 
claims while others remain to be determined is not, however, finai 
unless the lower court makes a specific finding that there isoo 
just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry of a fiwl 
judgment. Rule 54(b) provides: 
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple 
Parties. When more than one claim for relief is pre-
sented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry 
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
-3-
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designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is ~ubject to ~evision at any time 
before the entry of JUdgment adJudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. (emphasis supplied) 
Rule 54(b) also makes it plain that the term "claim" 
as used in Rule 72(a) means a claim for relief or cause of action. 
Thus, the April 8, 1975 "order" cannot be final within 
the meaning of Rule 72(a). It was not a final judgment or 
order of the first type because it did not completely terminate 
the proceedings in the lower court. It was not a final judgment 
or order of the second type because it did not wholly dispose of 
one claim and, furthermore, the lower court did not make the 
express determination required by Rule 54(b) for such an order 
or judgment to be final. 
The nonfinality of the April 8, 1975 "order" is 
dramatically accented by Judge Leary's order of June 21, 1977 
in which he restrained the issuance of executions until after 
notice and hearing, and restrained the sheriff from executing 
on defendant's property until a proper money judgment had been 
entered, after notice of hearing. 
Thus as of June 21, 1977, the April 8, 1975, "order" 
was at best an order determining liability alone reserving the 
question of amount. Such an order is not final. Wheatland Irr. 
Dist. v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Co., 431 P. 2d 257 (Wyo. 1967); 
Texas Pacific Oil co. v. A.D. Jone Estate, Inc., 78 N.M. 348, 
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431 P.2d 490 (1967); Clear v. Marvin, 83 Idaho 399, 363 P.2d 355 
(1961); Tuscon Telco Federal Credit Union v. Bowser, 6 A · r1z.App, 
10, 429 P.2d 501, reh. den., 6 Ariz.App. 190, 431 P.2r'l 85 (1%]); 
Hontz v. White, 58 Wash.2d 538, 348 P.2d 420 (1960). see~ 
v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965), in which this Court 
granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 72(b) of a summary 
judgment on liability alone, recognizing that summary judgments 
on liability alone are interlocutory in nature. Whatever the 
April 8, "order" and the order of June 21, 1977 taken together 
may be called, their effect is precisely identical to a summary 
judgment on the issue of liability alone."!!/ Indeed, Rule 56{c) 
itself classifies a summary judgment on the issue of liability 
alone as interlocutory: 
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone, although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(emphasis added) 
Thus the April 8 "order" as modified by the June 21 order was 
"interlocutory in character" and was not appealable. 
In the federal system, which, like Utah, has a policy 
against piecemeal review, determinations of liability reserving 
the issue of damages are not final and not appealable. ~ 
~/similarly, an order determining liability and 
requiring an accounting as to amount of damages has long been 
considered nonfinal. Standard Steam Laundry v. Dole, 20 Utah 
469, 58 P. 1109 (1899). See Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 r' 
Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277 (1937), approving Standard Steam La~ 
v. Dole, supra, and disapproving Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U 
10, 165 P-:-513 (1917). 
-5-
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v. Un~ted States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945); Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum 
Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. 
Burnett, 262 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1959). 
The April 8, 1975 "order" was not final. Because it 
was not final, the appellants were not required to file a notice 
of appeal or notice of intent to appeal under Rule 72(a). 
The real question confronted by this appeal is not the 
finality of the April 8, 1975 "order,tt but its validity both in 
terms of whether it correctly interpreted the earlier Judgment 
on Stipulation and whether it was entered in violation of 
appellant's due process rights. Respondents have not even 
mentioned these issues. 
II. RESPONDENTS' ASSERTIONS OF FACT SHOULD BE EXAMINED 
IN LIGHT OF THE RECORD. 
Counsel for appellant must call this Court's attention 
to respondents' misstatements of the Record and vague citations 
to it. A typical example of respondents' treatment of the Record 
is found on page 3 of Respondents' Brief where the Record cita-
tion reads "Record: All documentation during period August 1971, 
to March 1, 1975." This reference is to hundreds of pages. The 
supposed "facts" said to be supported by this reference are (1) 
that appellant was in default of the July 23, 1971 Judgment on 
Stipulation, (2) that appellant allowed funds belonging to 
respondents to be used for appellant's own benefit, and (3) that 
these funds amounted to at least $200,000. Not only does the 
Record fail to support these assertions, it specifically shows 
-6-
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that respondents' attempts to establish these positions before 
the lower court were failures. After presentation to the lo~r 
court, Judge Harding found on November 6, 1974, that 
[i]t is not shown that the [appellants] have received 
any proceeds from third-party purchasers which should 
have been applied to discharge the obligation sued 
upon in the aforesaid foreclosure actions . . or 
that any such proceeds had been diverted to other 
channels. (R. 405, App. 38) . 
Respondents next attempted to establish their factual 
assertions by filing the affidavit of Robert Major (R. 441-598) 
and causing a hearing to be held on February 27, 1975. But as 
appellant has pointed out (App. Main Br. 31-34), Judge Hardi~ 
properly determined that the affidavit and Major's testimony were 
incompetent hearsay and ruled only that more discovery was in 
order. Thus respondents' factual assertions upon examination 
turn out to be just assertions, without basis in the Record.d 
Another example is respondents' assertion (Resp. Br. 5! 
that pursuant to the April 8, 1975 "order" the current mone~cy 
amount due was determined. Understandably, there is no Record 
citation for this statement. The terms of the April 8 "order" 
required defendants to "certify in writing to this court". the 
amount currently due or upon failure of defendants so to certify, 
that the amounts certified by the purchase money obligees "s~ll 
be taken as correct" (R. 800-801, App. 59-60). The Record 
contains no such certification. 
~/Respondents on p. 11 of their Brief once again repeat 
this assertion without citations. 
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III. REPLY TO SPECIFIC REFUTATIONS. 
As noted above, at pp. 1-2, Respondents have, with only 
minor exceptions, failed to argue the merits of this appeal. 
Respondents specifically meet appellant's argument on only two 
points. The first is whether appellant had notice of the July 23, 
1971 Stipulation on Judgment. The second is whether appellant's 
factual recitation are material. 
A. Appellant Did Raise Lack of Notice Timely. 
Contrary to respondents' assertion, appellant 
properly raised in the lower court its lack of knowledge of the 
Stipulation on Judgment (R. 812-815, esp. 814-815, App. 64-67, 
esp. 67). Thus this issue is not being raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
B. Respondents' Argument That the Pacts Are 
Immaterial Misses the Point. 
Respondents, beginning on p. 24 of their Brief, 
attempt to dismiss the facts recited by appellant as iromaterial. 
The facts, respondents say, are immaterial because the issue was 
decided adversely to appellant below after ''evidentiary hearings" 
(Resp. Br. 26) or ''full evidentiary hearings" (Resp. Br. 27). 
This Court should notice that respondents do not 
use the word "trial," and correctly so for no trial was ever held. 
Similarly, "evidentiary hearing" and "full evidentiary hearing" 
are misnomers. As the Record reflects, what actually happened by 
way of "evidentiary hearings" is that respondents obtained an order 
to show cause, which was thereafter brought on for hearing, at 
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which time respondent (Krofcheck) alone testified. 
,\ddi tiona]] 
J• 
the files of this case were offered as evidence. The result ,,,2; 
a finding that respondents had proved no material fact and an 
order dismissing the order to show (R. 404-405; App. 37-39). 
The next event below \"'as a December 8, 1974 motion by 
respondents "to have final decrees herein enforced'' (R. 601, 
App. 53), in support of which Major's affidavit was filed. That 
motion was called up, and, as set forth in appellant's t1ain Brie: 
at 32, Major's attempt at that hearing to repeat his hearsay 
affidavit was abruptly terminated by the trial court (Tr. 10). 
These were the "full evidentiary hearings." Manifest: 
they were not trials. Equally manifest is the fact that t~y 
were not "full evidentiary hearings" but were instead summary 
hearings on respondents' motions during which respondents offen: 
evidence the court below expressly found to be insufficient ~ 
support the motions. 
Apparently respondents so characterize these heari~s 
in an attempt to shift from the summary judgment rule (the movi: 
party having to show affirmatively that there is no genuine issJ' 
of fact) to the rule governing this Court's review of factual 
findings upon trial (viewing the evidence in the light favorabl: 
to the victor below) There never having been a trial or a "tu: 
evidentiary hearing" below, the authority cited by respondents 
(Resp. Br. 25-26) is inappropriate. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
The whole point of this appeal is to afford appellant 
the ··full evidentiary hearing" that it was denied by the Sllil'.rnary 
judgment entered against it. Appellant is now before this Court 
beco.use the lower court entered an ex parte "order'' purporting to 
determine appellant's liability without notice to appellant and 
without a hearing. The district judges who were subsequently 
involved in the case could not overrule a fellow district judge, 
and ultimately converted the April 8, 1975 "order" into the 
sum~ary judg~ent from which this appeal is taken. This Court 
is not foreclosed by a district judge's "order" and has the power, 
and indeed the duty, to set aside the April 8, 1975 ~order" and 
subsequent sumnary judgment so that this case can be determined 
on its merits after due notice to all parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
warren Patten 
Charles B. Casper 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
~endell E. Bennett 
370 East 5th South 
salt LaY.e City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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